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DESCRIBING DRUGS: A RESPONSE TO
PROFESSORS ALLISON AND OUELLETTE
JACOB S. SHERKOW†
INTRODUCTION
In their article, How Courts Adjudicate Patent Definiteness and
Disclosure, John R. Allison and Lisa Larrimore Ouellette present a
comprehensive study—thirty years’ worth of cases—of federal courts’
application of patent law’s written-description, definiteness, and
1
enablement requirements. Using their own hand-coded dataset,
Allison and Ouellette measure a number of interesting disparities in
courts’ application of the two doctrines across various industries and
technologies. But one of their results is simply shocking: the massive
disparity in how courts apply patent law’s written-description
2
requirement in pharmaceutical cases. In Allison and Ouellette’s
study, pharmaceutical patents litigated as part of generic drug
manufacturers’ Abbreviated New Drug Applications (ANDAs)
before the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) fare no worse
on courts’ written-description analyses than a control,
3
industrial/business goods and services patents. But pharmaceutical
Copyright © 2016 Jacob S. Sherkow.
† Associate Professor, Innovation Center for Law and Technology, New York Law
School. Thank you to the editors of the Duke Law Journal for their thorough and insightful
comments on this response.
1. John R. Allison & Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, How Courts Adjudicate Patent
Definiteness and Disclosure, 65 DUKE L.J. 609 (2016); see also 35 U.S.C. § 112(a) (2012)
(requiring that patents “contain a written description of the invention” and “enable any person
skilled in the art to which it pertains . . . to make and use the same”).
2. See Allison & Ouellette, supra note 1, at 639 (defining pharmaceutical cases as “patents
on drugs for treating diseases or other abnormal conditions in humans or animals, as well as
processes for producing or using such drugs”).
3. See id. at 666 tbl.7.
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patents litigated outside of the ANDA context fare substantially
worse on courts’ written-description analyses—they are, by far, the
4
worst performers on written description of any industry. Indeed, nonANDA pharmaceutical patents’ poor written-description score is the
third most statistically significant result of any of the article’s sixtyone comparisons across different definiteness and disclosure
5
requirements, industries, jurisdiction, and procedural postures.
From the outset, there does not seem to be any ready
explanation for this disparity. Pharmaceutical patents in both the
ANDA and non-ANDA contexts are, obviously, part of the same
6
technology class (pharmaceutical patents); they are typically owned
by the same type of litigant, that is, brand pharmaceutical
7
manufacturers; and they are typically litigated in the same
8
jurisdictions. And yet, given the total sample size of pharmaceutical
patents in Allison and Ouellette’s dataset—only sixty-five unique
9
opinions —it is unclear whether the differences that exist between
courts’ written-description opinions of ANDA and non-ANDA
patents can be teased apart by more robust statistical analysis. To that
end, this brief response provides a qualitative analysis of Allison and
Ouellette’s quantitative one. It briefly reviews ANDA versus nonANDA patent litigation in Part I. It engages in several hypotheses
about differences between ANDA and non-ANDA pharmaceutical
patent cases in Part II. Next, in Part III, it reviews the most significant
ANDA and non-ANDA written-description cases from Allison and

4. See id.
5. See id. To be clear, statistical significance alone is no guarantee that a reported result is
the result of nonrandom effects, and differences in p-value across multivariable comparisons
may not amount to much. See generally STEPHEN T. ZILIAK & DEIRDRE N. MCCLOSKEY, THE
CULT OF STATISTICAL SIGNIFICANCE (2008) (describing the myriad problems of overreliance
on significance). Factors such as study design, small sample size, and the number of variables
measured often produced statistically significant measurements that are, in fact, meaningless.
See Regina Nuzzo, Scientific Method: Statistical Errors, NATURE (Feb. 12, 2014), http://
www.nature.com/news/scientific-method-statistical-errors-1.14700 [https://perma.cc/BHD4-8P
FZ] (discussing problems with p values). Nonetheless, the huge disparity between ANDA and
non-ANDA cases presented by Allison and Ouellette suggests something is worth investigating.
6. Allison & Ouellette, supra note 1, at 639–40.
7. See FED. TRADE COMM’N, GENERIC DRUG ENTRY PRIOR TO PATENT EXPIRATION:
AN FTC STUDY 17–19 (2002), https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/reports/genericdrug-entry-prior-patent-expiration-ftc-study/genericdrugstudy_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/WYV5C9VQ].
8. BRIAN C. HOWARD & JASON MAPLES, LEX MACHINA: HATCH-WAXMAN / ANDA
LITIGATION REPORT (2014) (on file with author).
9. See infra Appendix.
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Ouellette’s dataset. In particular, it shows that different types of
technologies at issue in some non-ANDA cases, such as biologics
rather than small molecule drugs, play a role in courts’ writtendescription assessments. Finally, Part IV provides several suggestions
for areas of future research and litigation.
I. ANDA VERSUS NON-ANDA PATENT LITIGATION
Before examining several hypotheses for Allison and Ouellette’s
ANDA versus non-ANDA written-description disparity, it may be
helpful to briefly recount how patent litigation differs procedurally in
both contexts. As part of any New Drug Application with the FDA, a
drug manufacturer must inform the agency which patents cover its
10
drug. The FDA then dutifully lists the “corresponding patent
numbers and expiration dates, in a fat, brightly hued volume called
the Orange Book (less colorfully but more officially denominated
Approved Drug Products with Therapeutic Equivalence
11
Evaluations).” Drug companies wishing to manufacture a generic
version of the original (brand) drug must then submit an Abbreviated
New Drug Application, an ANDA, to the FDA certifying that its
proposed generic product will not infringe the Orange Book-listed
patents or that those patents are invalid. This certification is, by
statute, an artificial act of patent infringement, and typically begins
12
ANDA patent litigation.
By contrast, non-ANDA patent litigation can take several forms.
Like ANDA patent litigation, it can be between a generic and brand
drug manufacturer on patents not included in the Orange Book, both
13
before and after the generic product has been approved by the FDA.
Non-ANDA patent litigation can also exist between two brand
14
manufacturers with two separately approved drug products. And in

10. Jacob S. Sherkow, Administrating Patent Litigation, 90 WASH. L. REV. 205, 214–15
(2015).
11. Caraco Pharm. Labs., Ltd. v. Novo Nordisk A/S, 132 S. Ct. 1670, 1676 (2012).
12. See Sherkow, supra note 10, at 214–15.
13. See, e.g., AbbVie Deutschland GmbH & Co., KG v. Janssen Biotech, Inc., 759 F.3d
1285 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (demonstrating a non-ANDA patent-infringement action after approval);
Eli Lilly & Co. v. Teva Pharm. USA, Inc., 619 F.3d 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (demonstrating a nonANDA injunctive action prior to approval).
14. See, e.g., Complaint for Declaratory Relief (Patent Infringement), Medicis Pharm.
Corp. v. Stiefel Labs., Inc., No. 5:10-CV-00621 (W.D. Tex. July 28, 2010).
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rare circumstances, non-ANDA patent litigation can be fought
15
between two rival generic manufacturers.
Despite these differences, ANDA and non-ANDA patent
litigation is mostly alike. Both generally concern the same
technological class of patents, that is, pharmaceutical patents. Both
are almost always between business competitors of one sort or
another—drug manufacturers seeking to sell similar, if not identical,
products. Both employ the same procedures found in federal district
court for all patent cases. And both groups of cases tend to be filed in
16
the same districts. At a high level of abstraction, there is little reason
that courts should apply differing written-description standards to
these two groups of pharmaceutical cases—let alone ones that are
subject to the dramatic differences reported by Allison and Ouellette.
II. HYPOTHESES ON THE ANDA VERSUS NON-ANDA WRITTENDESCRIPTION DISPARITY
In their article, Allison and Ouellette provide a few hypotheses
for the ANDA versus non-ANDA written-description disparity. The
first concerns differences in types of claims in ANDA versus nonANDA patents. Allison and Ouellette describe their reported
discrepancy between the two types of cases on “written-description
and definiteness grounds, likely because [non-ANDA] patents mostly
relate to various methods rather than FDA-approved drug
17
compositions.” The implication here is that claims on methods of
using approved drugs are more likely to fall afoul of patent law’s
definiteness requirement than claims on the drug compositions
themselves. The belief that non-ANDA patent litigation tends to
focus on “follow on patents,” rather than patents covering original
18
drug compositions, is widespread.

15. See, e.g., Teva Pharm. USA, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc., 723 F.3d 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2013).
16. See generally HOWARD & MAPLES, supra note 8.
17. Allison & Ouellette, supra note 1, at 614.
18. See Janet Freilich, The Paradox of Legal Equivalents and Scientific Equivalence:
Reconciling Patent Law’s Doctrine of Equivalents with the FDA’s Bioequivalence Requirement,
66 SMU L. REV. 59, 61–62 (2013); see also Yaniv Heled, Patents vs. Statutory Exclusivities in
Biological Pharmaceuticals—Do We Really Need Both?, 18 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L.
REV. 419, 468 n.218 (2012) (defining “follow on” or “secondary” patents as “patents claiming
(1) particular ways of formulating the product, (2) additional methods of manufacturing the
[active pharmaceutical ingredient] or any of the intermediate compounds involved in making it
and (3) additional methods of using the product or [active pharmaceutical ingredient] for
treating additional medical conditions”).
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Yet patents in both groups of Allison and Ouellette’s analysis—
ANDA and non-ANDA patents—contain both composition and
method claims. Of the seven unique opinions that blocked writtendescription challenges to ANDA patents, six concerned patents that
19
covered method claims. And of these six cases, four concerned
patents that claimed only methods of administration, rather than
20
compositions. Empirically, at least, the ANDA–non-ANDA writtendescription disparity cannot be explained by differences in the types
of claims presented in the two types of cases.
At a more theoretical level, Allison and Ouellette’s hypothesis
puts to test a long-standing belief that patent claims covering drug
compositions and methods of use differ in their judicial treatment.
Even though claims covering drug compositions are for tangible
things—and thus, perhaps, more easily described than abstract
methods—composition claims can, and do, fail the written-description
requirement. Claims for drug compositions often allow some
variability in the drug’s chemical structure, usually in an effort to
claim analogs to the principal drug. Drug composition claims may
allow so much variability, however, as to make the writtendescription requirement virtually impossible. In Boston Scientific
21
Corp. v. Johnson & Johnson, for example, the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit famously upheld the invalidation of a patent
claiming a rapamycin-eluting heart stent because the claims
contemplated tens of thousands of rapamycin analogs, only a
22
miniscule fraction of which were described. In other instances “a
single generic [drug composition] claim can easily encompass
23
millions, billions, or novemdecillions of compounds.” Aside from the
strength or weakness of pharmaceutical composition patents, it is

19. Bone Care Int’l, LLC v. Pentech Pharm., Inc., 862 F. Supp. 2d 790 (N.D. Ill. 2012);
Pfizer Inc. v. Teva Pharm. U.S.A. Inc., 882 F. Supp. 2d 643 (D. Del. 2012); Acorda Therapeutics
Inc. v. Apotex Inc., No. 07-CV-4973, 2011 WL 4074116 (D.N.J. Sept. 6, 2011); Research Found.
of State Univ. of N.Y. v. Mylan Pharm. Inc. (SUNY), 809 F. Supp. 2d 296 (D. Del. 2011); Alza
Corp. v. Mylan Labs., Inc., 388 F. Supp. 2d 717 (N.D. W. Va. 2005); Astra Aktiebolag v. Andrx
Pharm., Inc., 222 F. Supp. 2d 423 (S.D.N.Y. 2002).
20. Bone Care, 862 F. Supp. 2d at 793 (concerning U.S. Patent No. 5,602,116); Acorda
Therapeutics Inc., 2011 WL 4074116 at *1 (concerning U.S. Patent No. 6,455,557); SUNY, 809 F.
Supp. 2d at 298 (concerning U.S. Patent Nos. 7,211,267; 7,232,572); Astra, 222 F. Supp. 2d at 591
(concerning U.S. Patent No. 5,093,342).
21. Boston Sci. Corp. v. Johnson & Johnson, 647 F.3d 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
22. Id. at 1365.
23. Sean B. Seymore, Heightened Enablement in the Unpredictable Arts, 56 UCLA L. REV.
127, 146 (2008) (footnotes omitted).
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unclear that pharmaceutical method-of-use patents are, by their
nature, relatively weaker than composition claims. Many
pharmaceutical method-of-use claims, despite their perception as
being weak, have easily vaulted over the written-description
24
requirement.
Allison and Ouellette also suggest that ANDA patents may
outperform their non-ANDA counterparts on various validity scores
because they “are likely to have far more private economic value to
their owners than many other kinds of patents, meaning that
patentees will invest much more in fighting to preserve their
25
validity.” It is indeed true that Orange Book-listed patents—or, at
least, the market exclusivity that comes with them—are worth
26
tremendous amounts of money. But here, too, the hypothesis does
not seem to account for the relative performance of ANDA to nonANDA pharmaceutical patents. Non-ANDA patents protect a
pharmaceutical product, too—one that, like an Orange Book-listed
patent, quells competition in a lucrative arena. In Medicis
27
Pharmaceutical Corp. v. Stiefel Laboratories, Inc. —a non-ANDA
28
patent dispute between two brand competitors —Medicis’s patents
29
protected a franchise worth roughly $400 million per year. It is
unclear in situations like these whether the economic value of the
patents, or the attorneys’ incentives to preserve those patents’
validity, shifts with such patents being listed (or not) in the Orange
Book. It is also unclear why the written-description requirement, of
all of patent law’s several substantive requirements, appears to
greatly disfavor those patents not listed in the Orange Book.
At PatCon V in 2015, at the University of Kansas, another patent
scholar, David Schwartz, discussed yet another hypothesis for the
ANDA–non-ANDA disparity described by Allison and Ouellette’s
24. See, e.g., Allergan Inc. v. Watson Labs. Inc., 869 F. Supp. 2d 456, 469 (D. Del. 2012)
(concerning U.S. Patent No. 7,759,359, covering methods of treating bladder dysfunction by
using trospium).
25. Allison & Ouellette, supra note 1, at 662.
26. C. Scott Hemphill, Paying for Delay: Pharmaceutical Patent Settlement as a Regulatory
Design Problem, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1553, 1568–69 (2005).
27. Complaint for Declaratory Relief (Patent Infringement), Medicis Pharm. Corp. v.
Stiefel Labs., Inc., No. 5:10-CV-00621 (W.D. Tex. July 28, 2010) (N.B.: the author represented
Medicis in this dispute).
28. Id. at 3–4.
29. Medicis Pharm. Corp., Annual Report, (Form 10-K) 71 (Dec. 31, 2012). The case was
later dismissed by stipulation in 2013. Amended Stipulation and Order of Dismissal, Medicis
Pharm. Corp. v. Stiefel Labs., Inc., No. 5:10-CV-00621 (W.D. Tex. June 26, 2013).
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results. All things being equal, ANDA cases are more likely to settle
than their non-ANDA counterparts because the stakes involved are
often much higher. By and large, ANDA cases operate in the context
of monopoly: at the time the infringement suit is filed, only the brand
30
pharmaceutical product has been approved by the FDA. That
monopoly is often worth billions of dollars to the patent holder. The
uncertainty of litigation, therefore, frequently counsels brand
manufacturers to settle with their generic rivals—often for large sums
31
of money—to preserve their patents’ validity. Non-ANDA cases,
however, often operate in the context of competition: at the time the
infringement suit is filed, both rivals’ products have been approved by
32
the FDA. To that end, the incentives for settling—and the
importance of maintaining patent validity—are relatively low as
compared to their ANDA counterparts. ANDA patent cases are
therefore, according to Schwartz, likely to center on stronger
patents—patents that brand drug manufacturers believe will survive
generics’ challenges.
Whether ANDA cases do settle more frequently than nonANDA cases remains to be seen. But, again, Schwartz’s hypothesis
does not seem to explain why non-ANDA cases’ written-description
scores fare more poorly than their enablement or indefiniteness
scores. It seems odd to suggest, all things being equal, that ANDA
holders’ incentives to maintain drug monopolies are only more
sensitive to invalidity claims predicated on written-description, but
not invalidity claims predicated on enablement or indefiniteness.
Furthermore, if the stakes are high enough, a settlement-incentive
theory that is uniquely sensitive to written-description-invalidity
claims should work equally well in the non-ANDA context.
Preventing competitors from entering a $400-million marketplace, as
in Medicis, should provide an equal incentive to patent holders in the
ANDA and non-ANDA contexts.
None of the strongest hypotheses seem to provide satisfying
answers to the chasm in written-description treatment between
ANDA and non-ANDA cases. And yet, Allison and Ouellette’s
evidence clearly demonstrates the existence of such a disparity. The
answers, if clear ones exist, likely lie in the cases themselves.

30. See 21 U.S.C. § 355(j) (2010).
31. Hemphill, supra note 26, at 1557.
32. See supra notes 13–15 and accompanying text.

SHERKOW IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

3/23/2016 10:34 PM

134

[Vol. 65:127

DUKE LAW JOURNAL ONLINE

III. ANDA VERSUS NON-ANDA WRITTEN-DESCRIPTION
DECISIONS
Allison and Ouellette’s dataset concerning § 112 decisions in
pharmaceutical patent cases consists of sixty-five unique opinions:
thirty-six ANDA opinions and twenty-nine non-ANDA opinions. Of
the ANDA opinions, ten had a written-description score of at least
one on either Allison and Ouellette’s five-level scale or three-level
33
scale. Of the non-ANDA opinions, nine had a written-description
score of at least one. Thus, it would appear that the writtendescription requirement was at issue in roughly equal proportions:
27.7 percent (10/36) of ANDA cases and 31.0 percent (9/29) of non34
ANDA cases.
Interestingly, Allison and Ouellette’s written-description
disparity arises in how the courts dispose of these issues. Of the ten
ANDA opinions where written-description was at issue, seven
declared valid all of the claims of the asserted patents under the
written-description requirement; one declared at least some of the
claims invalid for lacking a proper written description; and two
concluded that factual issues prevented a resolution of the
defendants’ written-description arguments. But of the nine nonANDA cases discussing the written-description requirement, five
declared at least one claim of the asserted patent invalid for failing
the written-description requirement; three concluded that factual
issues prevented a disposition of the defendants’ written-description
arguments; and only one affirmatively rebuffed the defendant’s
35
written-description challenges.
To put these numbers in this context, Allison and Ouellette’s
dataset shows that out of thirty-six ANDA opinions, only a single
36
one—Alcon Research Ltd. v. Barr Laboratories Inc. —invalidated a

33. Allison and Ouellette describe their two scales as follows. First, the five-level scale
record[s] the relative strength of each decision on the following . . . (1) invalid as a
matter of law; (2) fact issue followed by a ruling of invalidity; (3) fact issue remaining;
(4) fact issue followed by a ruling of validity; or (5) valid as a matter of law. . . . We
also created a coarser one-to-three scale by collapsing “as a matter of law” and “fact
issue followed by a validity or invalidity ruling” to produce “total valid” and “total
invalid” outcomes on each of the three issues.
Allison & Ouellette, supra note 1, at 631.
34. See infra Appendix.
35. See id.
36. Alcon Research Ltd. v. Barr Labs. Inc., 837 F. Supp. 2d 364 (D. Del. 2011), aff’d in part,
rev’d in part, 745 F.3d 1180 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
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patent’s claims on lack-of-written-description grounds. By contrast,
out of twenty-nine non-ANDA opinions, only a single one—Allergan,
38
Inc. v. Watson Laboratories, Inc. —rejected the defendants’ written39
description arguments, while five others invalidated the claims at
issue for lacking a proper written description. In short, the disparity
uncovered by Allison and Ouellette seems to show that, while both
ANDA and non-ANDA litigants raise written-description issues in
relatively equal proportions, courts in the ANDA context rarely, if
ever, invalidate those patents on written-description grounds.
This comparative examination shows one surprising facet: courts’
differing levels of engagement with the merits of the writtendescription arguments. The single opinion to invalidate an ANDA
patent on written-description grounds, Alcon, appears to have done
so reluctantly and with little analysis. Alcon’s patents covered
Travatan, a medication indicated for treating glaucoma and ocular
hypertension that used castor oil to stabilize the formulation’s
40
components. Alcon’s patent’s claims, however, did not specify the
precise quantities of castor oil for either effective preparation or
41
treatment. To that end, the district court concluded that the patents
42
were too broad to be enabling. But the court’s opinion came on the
43
heels of Ariad Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., a seminal
case from the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit that
separated enablement and written-description as free-standing
44
doctrines. Perhaps confused by the application of these two
doctrines—or cuing up the case for a single appeal—the Alcon court
concluded that the breadth of the patent’s claims merited invalidation
under both theories:
[W]e believe that the Section 112, first paragraph, analysis in this
case proceeds more cleanly through the enablement framework than
through a written description-type inquiry. Nonetheless, given the
current state of written description jurisprudence, we find that the
castor oil patent claims also fail the written description requirement

37. Id. at 392.
38. Allergan, Inc. v. Watson Labs., Inc., 869 F. Supp. 2d 456 (D. Del. 2012).
39. Id. at 469. And even there, the court ultimately invalidated the asserted patents for
obviousness. Id. at 519.
40. Alcon Research Ltd., 837 F. Supp. 2d at 367.
41. Id. at 381.
42. Id.
43. Ariad Pharm., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 598 F.3d 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
44. Id. at 1351.
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for essentially the same reasons that they fail the enablement
requirement: the art in question is highly unpredictable and the
claims are extremely broad, but the written description is relatively
45
limited.

By contrast, the only non-ANDA opinion to uphold the asserted
patents on written-description grounds—Allergan—did so after a
lengthy analysis of the written-description requirement and expert
46
testimony as to the substance of the claims. In contrast to the claims
at issue in Alcon, the claim discussed in Allergan was narrow: it
required that the maximum concentration of the drug, trospium, in
patients’ blood fell below a much larger range than disclosed in the
47
patent’s specification. The court examined testimony from three
experts on this aspect of the invention alone, comparing their
testimony to four formulations of the same invention disclosed in the
48
patent. Ultimately, after finding one expert’s testimony to be the
most persuasive, the court concluded that the patent “provided
guidance to those skilled in the art that the low [maximum blood
concentration] range limitation is an aspect of the invention and the
49
applicants were in possession of it.”
Apart from the level of engagement, the non-ANDA and
ANDA opinions in Allison and Ouellette’s dataset appear to concern
differing technologies. For example, by statutory design, the ANDA
opinions exclusively cover “small molecule” drugs, which are
relatively simple to describe in writing. Biologics—the focus of
several non-ANDA cases in Allison and Ouellette’s dataset—
however, are larger, complex molecules that are much more difficult
to describe in writing. Indeed, in many instances, patentees of
biologics can only describe them in functional terms: what they bind
to or from where they are derived, rather than their precise chemical
50
structure. For that reason, at the margins at least, non-ANDA
patents may be more susceptible to written-description attacks than
their ANDA counterparts.

45. Alcon Research Ltd., 837 F. Supp. 2d at 384 (footnote omitted).
46. Allergan, Inc. v. Watson Labs., Inc., 869 F. Supp. 2d 456, 497–99 (D. Del. 2012).
47. Id. at 498–99.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 499.
50. See generally Jason Kanter & Robin Feldman, Understanding and Incentivizing
Biosimilars, 64 HASTINGS L.J. 57 (2012) (discussing the differences in patents claiming biologics
relative to small molecule therapies).
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Indeed, of the five non-ANDA opinions finding the asserted
patents invalid for lacking a sufficient written description, three
appear to have concerned non-traditional pharmaceutical
technologies. Both AbbVie Deutschland GmbH & Co. v. Janssen
51
Biotech, Inc. and Centocor Ortho Biotech, Inc. v. Abbott
52
Laboratories, for example, concerned antibodies—large, complex
53
biologics famously difficult to describe. And in both cases, the
Federal Circuit faulted the patentee for claiming, but failing to fully
describe, a broad “genus” of antibodies. In AbbVie, the Federal
Circuit affirmed a jury’s finding that the asserted patents did not
“adequately describe representative antibodies to reflect the
structural diversity of the claimed genus,” a problem that is prevalent
“in technology fields that are highly unpredictable, where it is difficult
to establish a correlation between structure and function for the
whole genus or to predict what would be covered by the functionally
54
claimed genus.” In Centocor, the Federal Circuit was incredulous
that “the patent broadly claim[ed] a class of antibodies that
contain[ed] human variable regions, [even though] the specification
d[id] not describe a single antibody that satisfie[d] the claim
55
limitations.” Similarly, in University of Rochester v. G.D. Searle &
56
Co., the court was tasked with determining the sufficiency of the
patent’s description of methods of genetically inhibiting PGHS-2, a
57
protein involved in inflammation. Because the patent described the
invention in functional rather than tangible terms, the Federal Circuit
upheld the invalidation of the patent, noting that “[e]ven with the
three-dimensional structures of [related] enzymes . . . in hand, it may
even now not be within the ordinary skill in the art to predict what
58
compounds might bind to and inhibit them . . . .”
Competing problems of broad claiming and technological
uncertainty are simply unlikely to occur in small-molecule ANDA

51. AbbVie Deutschland GmbH & Co. v. Janssen Biotech, Inc., 759 F.3d 1285 (Fed. Cir.
2014).
52. Centocor Ortho Biotech, Inc. v. Abbott Labs., 636 F.3d 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
53. Douglas G. Metcalf, Therapeutic Antibody Patent Infringement Litigation: Untested and
Uncertain Litigation Strategies Underpin Patents Protecting Multibillion-Dollar Pharmaceuticals,
19 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 194, 203–04 (2013).
54. AbbVie Deutschland GmbH & Co., 759 F.3d at 1301.
55. Centocor, 636 F.3d at 1350–51.
56. Univ. of Rochester v. G.D. Searle & Co., 358 F.3d 916 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
57. Id. at 917–18.
58. Id. at 925.
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cases—something borne out by the seven ANDA opinions finding the
asserted claims valid despite written-description objections. In those
cases, the courts confronted traditional pharmaceutical claims
directed toward a chemically precise compound, formulations, or
methods of using a previously known drug. The patent at issue in
59
GlaxoSmithKline LLC v. Banner Pharmacaps, Inc., for example,
concerned composition claims—that is, claims covering a specific
60
chemical compound dutasteride. There, the court simply concluded
that “under each side’s construction and reading of the specification,
the description matches the claim, and regardless of which side is
right, the description remains entirely based on structure of the
compound and its process of creation. . . . We have no precedent . . .
61
[that this] would be insufficient.” Similarly, in Acorda Therapeutics
62
Inc. v. Apotex Inc., the asserted claims covered a method of treating
a spastic patient with tizanidine, a well-known drug, as well as a way
63
of manufacturing the treatment. The court’s written-description
analysis in Acorda consisted of a single, short paragraph finding “no
lack of description in the specification for the claim scope,” especially
because “the claim term’s inclusion of [the contested term] came
64
directly from its express definition in the specification.” And in
65
Pfizer Inc. v. Teva Pharmaceuticals U.S.A. Inc., the district court
sided with the patent holder’s expert to find that the patent’s
description of the drug and its variants proved that “chemists would
understand what the disclosure meant” and would be “more than
sufficient to convey to those of skill in the art the subject matter of
the claimed invention and that the inventors were in ‘possession of
66
it.’”
From a broader perspective, the substance of these decisions
suggests that technology class plays a crucial role in courts’ writtendescription determinations of pharmaceutical patents. The more basic
the pharmaceutical technology—simple compounds, traditional
formulations, or typical methods of use—the less likely it is that
59. GlaxoSmithKline LLC v. Banner Pharmacaps, Inc., 744 F.3d 725 (2014).
60. Id. at 726–27.
61. Id. at 730.
62. Acorda Therapeutics Inc. v. Apotex Inc., No. 07-CV-4973, 2011 WL 4074116 (D.N.J.
Sept. 6, 2011).
63. Id. at *2.
64. Id. at *25.
65. Pfizer Inc. v. Teva Pharm. U.S.A. Inc., 882 F. Supp. 2d 643 (D. Del 2012).
66. Id. at 702.
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challengers will be able to prove, by clear and convincing evidence,
that the asserted patents lack a sufficient written description. But the
more complex the technology—derivative compounds with numerous
radical groups, new formulations or dosage forms, or atypical
methods of use—the more likely it is that challengers will be able to
prove a lack of written description. Put another way, the more
complex or unpredictable the technology, the easier it will be to prove
that the claims are not sufficiently described. As a consequence,
ANDA patents will seem to survive written-description challenges
more frequently than their non-ANDA cousins because ANDA
patents—by their nature—focus only on traditional, small-molecule
pharmaceuticals. Furthermore, where this analysis fails, it seems to
fail only at the extremes. Where courts have given either short shrift
or Talmudic thoroughness to their written-description analyses,
results, like those in Alcon and Allergan, seem more likely to occur.
In all, a more detailed examination of the cases scoring at least Level
One on Allison and Ouellette’s written-description scales suggests
that the ANDA/non-ANDA disparity is perhaps best explained not
by “litigation metrics”—the value in dispute or the likelihood of
settlement, for example—but by the underlying technology itself.
VI. FUTURE RESEARCH
Allison and Ouellette note that their “results on how § 112 has
been applied in practice will be helpful in evaluating current
proposals for reform, and our rich dataset—which we are making
publicly available—will enable more systematic [future] studies of
67
these critical doctrines.” This is undoubtedly true for their writtendescription results in the pharmaceutical context. To that end, Allison
and Ouellette’s study—and the analysis here—suggests several
avenues for further research, both quantitative and, perhaps more
importantly, qualitative.
First, Allison and Ouellette’s dataset runs through 2012. As a
result, the dataset does not include two major patent decisions that
may significantly affect how courts apply the written-description
doctrine to pharmaceutical technologies going forward. The first of
these is the Federal Circuit’s en banc decision of the Ariad case,
68
discussed earlier. Although that case was decided in 2011, and is

67. Allison & Ouellette, supra note 1, at 612.
68. See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
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captured in Allison and Ouellette’s dataset, the implications of Ariad
are likely to be recognized in the future—to the detriment of
patentees in both the ANDA and non-ANDA contexts. Ariad’s
conclusion, that the written-description doctrine exists separately
from either definiteness or enablement, may become additional
fodder for patent challengers. The second case is the Supreme Court’s
69
recent decision in FTC v. Actavis, Inc. That decision barred many
types of settlements between brand pharmaceuticals and generic
70
challengers in ANDA cases. With these “reverse payment”
settlements now off the table, it appears that more ANDA cases will
be litigated to judgment—thus, potentially producing more
invalidating-written-description opinions than exist currently.
Because these shifts in doctrine portend a greater number of ANDA
patents failing under the written-description requirement, a postAriad and Actavis follow-up study to Allison and Ouellette’s article
would be informative.
A second avenue for further research concerns the rise of
biologic drugs or, simply, “biologics.” An increasing number of top71
selling therapeutics are biologics. Current law mandates that
72
biologics patents are litigated outside of the ANDA context. But
with the 2009 Biologics Price Competition and Innovation Act
(BPCIA)—and with a recent decision by the Federal Circuit
clarifying the BPCIA—there may be an increasing amount of
73
ANDA-style patent-litigation. The BPCIA, nonetheless, has thus far
proven famously fruitless, with only a single generic biologic—termed
74
a biosimilar—approved to date. Should the FDA approve an
increasing number of biosimilars—an act likely to generate an
increasing amount of non-ANDA patent litigation—commentators
interested in the written-description requirement may want to revisit
Allison and Ouellette’s study with fresh data.
Lastly, a more thorough analysis of Allison and Ouellette’s
dataset would also review pharmaceutical cases where the written-

69. FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223 (2013).
70. Id. at 2237–38.
71. Jeanne Yang, Note, A Pathway to Follow-On Biologics, 3 HASTINGS SCI. & TECH. L.J.
217, 217 (2011).
72. See Kanter & Feldman, supra note 50, at 59.
73. See, e.g., Amgen Inc. v. Sandoz Inc., 794 F.3d 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
74. See Lindsay Kelly, Biologics in the Practice of Law, 39 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 21, 23
(2016) (“[O]nly a few biosimilar applications have been filed with the Food and Drug
Administration (FDA), and just one biosimilar has been approved to date.”).
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description requirement was not litigated. A review of the related
patents and their specifications may prove informative as to why
parties did not litigate such issues to judgment. Such an investigation
may uncover some of the technology-specific effects addressed here—
that, for example, traditional technologies in both the ANDA and
non-ANDA contexts did not give rise to written-description issues.
Here, as in other instances, the “curious incident” worthy of study lies
75
in the dog that did not bark.
More generally, Allison and Ouellette’s study provides insight
into the future of empirical versus doctrinal patent scholarship. The
authors’ methodology appears to be helpful for collecting and
analyzing, at a high level, a large number of otherwise complex and
doctrinally diverse cases. Simply determining—and counting—what
constitutes a “written-description opinion,” and what to do where
multiple patents are at issue, is difficult. This is especially the case
when done in bulk. But, more than anything, Allison and Ouellette’s
study demonstrates that it is possible to define a closed universe of
cases for a given doctrine or technology area, and to weigh their
outcomes and the levels of their analyses.
Their study also demonstrates, however, the limits of larger
empirical assessments for narrower doctrines or technology classes. In
some data slices—such as non-ANDA pharmaceutical cases that
upheld the validity of a patent subject to written-description
76
challenges—we have an N of 1. This means that the power of their
specific results for any given case is open to further qualitative
analysis—and possible contradiction. As demonstrated by the Alcon
decision, some questions will simply turn on idiosyncrasies that
empirical analyses cannot capture. Allison and Ouellette’s article,
77
therefore, shows the importance of close doctrinal analyses of cases.
Their study, and others like it, provide excellent jumping-off points
for further research—both quantitative and quantitative.

75. Cf. Dan L. Burk, The Curious Incident of the Supreme Court in Myriad Genetics, 90
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 505, 505–06 (2014) (comparing the Supreme Court’s silence on Mayo
Collaborative Services v. Prometheus Laboratories, Inc. in the later-decided Association for
Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc. to be like the “curious incident” of the dog that
did not bark in the Sherlock Holmes tale, Silver Blaze).
76. See, e.g., Allergan, Inc. v. Watson Labs., Inc., 869 F. Supp. 2d 456, 459 (D. Del. 2012)
(invalidating a patent, but not for written-description issues).
77. See supra notes 40–65 and accompanying text.

SHERKOW IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

3/23/2016 10:34 PM

142

[Vol. 65:127

DUKE LAW JOURNAL ONLINE
CONCLUSION

Allison and Ouellette’s article concerning patent law’s writtendescription requirement provides a shocking disparity between
pharmaceutical cases in the ANDA versus non-ANDA contexts.
Scholars, including Allison and Ouellette, have provided several highlevel hypotheses as to these results, but none appear to provide
satisfactory answers. A further examination of the underlying cases in
Allison and Ouellette’s dataset provides two insights: One, the
written-description requirement is at issue in roughly equal numbers
in ANDA versus non-ANDA cases. But, two, for the decisions that
do discuss the written-description requirement, almost every ANDA
case survives the courts’ written-description analyses, while a large
number of non-ANDA cases fail them. A closer examination of these
cases reveals that this disparity is likely due to particular
idiosyncrasies in each case, rather than a high-level of assessment of
whether they arose in the ANDA or non-ANDA contexts. Allison
and Ouellette’s article, in turn, demonstrates the power and limits of
empirical patent scholarship when addressing narrow doctrinal or
technological inquiries.
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APPENDIX
UNIQUE PHARMACEUTICAL PATENT OPINIONS IN ALLISON &
OUELLETTE (2016)
Legend: 1 = Written Description Valid as a Matter of Law; 2 = Written Description Fact Issue—
Valid; 3 = Written Description Invalid as a Matter of Law; 4 = Written Description Fact Issue—
Invalid; 5 = Written Description Fact Issue—Remaining
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Acorda Therapeutics Inc. v. Apotex Inc., No.
07-CV-4973, 2011 WL 4074116 (D.N.J. Sept.
6, 2011)
Alza Corp. v. Mylan Labs., Inc., 388 F. Supp.
2d 717 (N.D. W. Va. 2005)
Astra Aktiebolag v. Andrx Pharm., Inc., 222
F. Supp. 2d 423 (S.D.N.Y. 2002)
Bone Care Int’l, LLC v. Pentech Pharm., Inc.,
862 F. Supp. 2d 790 (N.D. Ill. 2012)
GlaxoSmithKline

LLC

v.

Banner

Pharmacaps, Inc., 744 F.3d 725 (Fed. Cir.
2014)
Pfizer Inc. v. Teva Pharm. U.S.A. Inc., 882 F.
Supp. 2d 643 (D. Del. 2012)
Research Found. of State Univ. of N.Y. v.
Mylan Pharm. Inc., 809 F. Supp. 2d 296 (D.
Del. 2011)
Abbott Labs. v. Andrx Pharm., Inc., 473 F.3d
1196 (Fed. Cir. 2007)
Glaxo Wellcome Inc. v. Eon Labs Mfg. Inc.,
No.

00-CV-9089,

2003

WL

22004874

(S.D.N.Y. Aug. 22, 2003)
Alcon Research Ltd v. Barr Labs., 837 F.
Supp. 2d 364 (D. Del. 2011)

1

Abbott Labs. v. TorPharm Inc., 300 F.3d 1367
(Fed. Cir. 2002)
Alza Corp. v. Mylan Labs., Inc., 349 F. Supp.
2d 1002 (N.D. W. Va. 2004)
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Legend: 1 = Written Description Valid as a Matter of Law; 2 = Written Description Fact Issue—
Valid; 3 = Written Description Invalid as a Matter of Law; 4 = Written Description Fact Issue—
Invalid; 5 = Written Description Fact Issue—Remaining
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Aventis Pharma Deutschland GmbH v. Lupin
Ltd., No. 2:05-CV-421, 2006 WL 2008962
(S.D.N.Y. July 17, 2006)
Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Andrx Pharm.,
Inc., 343 F. Supp. 2d 1124 (S.D. Fla. 2004)
Cephalon, Inc. v. Watson Pharm., Inc., 707
F.3d 1330 (Fed. Cir. 2013)
Eli Lilly & Co. v. Actavis Elizabeth LLC, 435
F. App’x 917 (Fed. Cir. 2011)
Eli Lilly & Co. v. Sicor Pharm. Inc., 705 F.
Supp. 2d 971 (S.D. Ind. 2010)
Eli Lilly & Co. v. Teva Parenteral Medicines,
No. 1:10-CV-1376, 2012 WL 2358102 (S.D.
Ind. June 20, 2012)
Glaxo Grp. Ltd v. Teva Pharm. USA Inc., No.
02-CV-219, 2004 WL 1875017 (D. Del. Aug.
20, 2004)
Glaxo Grp. Ltd. V. Apotex Inc., 376 F.3d 1339
(Fed. Cir. 2004)
Glaxo Wellcome Inc. v. EON Labs Mfg. Inc.,
No. 00-CV-9089, 2002 WL 1874830 (S.D.N.Y.
Aug. 13, 2002)
Glaxo Wellcome Inc. v. Eon Labs Mfg. Inc.,
No.

00-CV-9089,

2003

WL

22004871

(S.D.N.Y. Aug. 22, 2003)
Imperial Chemical Indus. PLC v. Barr Labs.,
795 F. Supp. 619 (S.D.N.Y. 1992)
Imperial Chemical Indus. PLC v. Danbury
Pharmacal Inc., 777 F. Supp. 330 (D. Del.
1991)
Medicis Pharmaceutical Corp. v. Actavis Mid
Atl. LLC, No. 11-409-LPS-CJB, 2012 WL
2126873 (D. Del. June 12, 2012)
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Legend: 1 = Written Description Valid as a Matter of Law; 2 = Written Description Fact Issue—
Valid; 3 = Written Description Invalid as a Matter of Law; 4 = Written Description Fact Issue—
Invalid; 5 = Written Description Fact Issue—Remaining
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Momenta Pharm., Inc. v. Amphastar Pharm.,
Inc., 887 F. Supp. 2d 303 (D. Mass. 2012)
Ortho-McNeil Pharm. Inc. v. Kali Labs., 482
F. Supp. 2d 478 (D.N.J. 2007)
Ortho-McNeil Pharm. Inc. v. Mylan Labs.,
Inc., No. 04-CV-1689, 2006 WL 2865469
(D.N.J. Oct. 5, 2006)
Ortho-McNeil-Janssen Pharm. Inc. v. Watson
Labs. Inc., No. 08-5103(SRC), 2011 WL
254313 (D.N.J. Oct. 5, 2006)
Ranbaxy Labs. Ltd v. Abbott Labs., No. 04CV-8078, 2005 WL 3050608 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 10,
2005)
Schering Corp. v. Mylan Pharm. Inc., No. 09CV-6383, 2011 WL 3736503 (D.N.J. Aug. 22,
2011)
Senju Pharm. Co. Ltd v. Apotex Inc., 717 F.
Supp. 2d 404 (D. Del. 2010)
SmithKline Beecham Corp. v. Apotex Corp.,
286 F. Supp. 2d 925 (N.D. Ill. 2001)
SmithKline Beecham Corp. v. Apotex Corp.,
403 F.3d 1331 (Fed. Cir. 2005)
Takeda Pharm. Co, Ltd v. Handa Pharm.,
LLC, No. 11-CV-840, 2012 WL 1243109 (N.D.
Cal. Apr. 11, 2012)
Wyeth v. Mylan Pharm. Inc., No. 07-CV-91,
2009 WL 3335062 (N.D. W. Va. Oct. 14, 2009)
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Legend: 1 = Written Description Valid as a Matter of Law; 2 = Written Description Fact Issue—
Valid; 3 = Written Description Invalid as a Matter of Law; 4 = Written Description Fact Issue—
Invalid; 5 = Written Description Fact Issue—Remaining
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Allergan Inc. v. Watson Labs. Inc., 869 F.
Supp. 2d 456 (D. Del. 2012)
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Emory Univ. v. Glaxo Wellcome Inc., 96-CV1868, 1997 WL 817342 (N.D. Ga. July 14,
1997)
O’Hara Mfg. Ltd v. Eli Lilly & Co., No. 85-cv3979, 1986 WL 8391 (N.D. Ill. July 21, 1986)
Oakwood Labs. v. Tap Pharm. Prods. Inc.,
No. 01-CV-7631, 2003 WL 22400759 (N.D. Ill.
2003)
AbbVie Deutschland GmbH & Co., KG v.
Janssen Biotech, Inc., 759 F.3d 1285 (Fed. Cir.
2014)
Eli Lilly & Co. v. Teva Pharm. USA Inc., 619
F.3d 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2010)
Purdue Pharma LP v. Faulding Inc., 230 F.3d
1320 (Fed. Cir. 2000)
Centocor Ortho Biotech Inc. v. Abbott Labs.,
636 F.3d 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2011)
Univ. of Rochester v. G.D. Searle & Co., 358
F.3d 916 (Fed. Cir. 2004)
Abbott GMBH & Co., KG v. Centocor Ortho
Biotech, Inc., 870 F. Supp. 2d 206 (D. Mass.
2012)
Abbott Labs. v. Teva Pharm. USA Inc., No.
02-CV-1512, 2005 WL 6225546 (D. Del. May
6, 2005)
ALZA Corp. v. Andrx Pharm., LLC, 603 F.3d
935 (Fed. Cir. 2010)
Amgen Inc v. Chugai Pharm. Co. Ltd., 927
F.2d 1200 (Fed. Cir. 1991)
Amgen Inc. v. F. Hoffman-LA Roche Ltd.,
580 F.3d 1340 (Fed. Cir.2009)
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Valid; 3 = Written Description Invalid as a Matter of Law; 4 = Written Description Fact Issue—
Invalid; 5 = Written Description Fact Issue—Remaining
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1297 (S.D. Fla. 2013)
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Hoffman-La Roche Inc. v. Lemmon Co., No.
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1989).
Liposome Co. Inc. v. Vestar Inc., No. 92-CV332, 1994 WL 738952 (D. Del. Dec. 20, 1994)
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Pharm. Res. Inc. v. Roxane Labs. Inc., 253
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Teva Pharm. USA, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc., 723
F.3d 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2013)
Tristrata Tech. Inc. v. ICN Pharm. Inc., 313 F.
Supp. 2d 405 (D. Del. 2004)
UCB Inc. v. KV Pharm. Co., 08-CV-223, 2009
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